On the optimality of a duty-to-rescue rule and the cost of wrongful intervention
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- Sophie Harnay & Alain Marciano, 2009. "Should I help my neighbor? Self-interest, altruism and economic analyses of rescue laws," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 103-131, October.
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- Rothenhäusler, Dominik & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2013. "Institutions, shared guilt, and moral transgression," Working Paper Series in Economics 47, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering.
- Dominik Rothenhaüsler & Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech, 2016. "Guilt in Voting and Public Good Games," Working Papers 2016-026, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Rothenhäusler, Dominik & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2016. "Guilt in voting and public good games," Working Paper Series in Economics 99, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering.
- Rothenhäusler, Dominik & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2013. "Institutions, shared guilt, and moral transgression," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2013-305, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- repec:eee:eecrev:v:101:y:2018:i:c:p:664-681 is not listed on IDEAS
- Szech, Nora & Rothenhäusler, Dominik & Schweizer, Nikolaus, 2014. "Institutions, Shared Guilt, and Moral Transgression," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100518, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Dominik Rothenhäusler & Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech, 2015. "Institutions, Shared Guilt, and Moral Transgression," CESifo Working Paper Series 5525, CESifo Group Munich.
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KeywordsBystander effect; Duty to rescue;
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
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