IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game

Listed author(s):
  • Astrid Dannenberg
  • Andreas L�schel
  • Gabriele Paolacci
  • Christiane Reif
  • Alessandro Tavoni

We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The negative effect of threshold uncertainty was particularly severe when it took the form of ambiguity, i.e. when players were not only unaware of the value of the threshold but also of its probability distribution. Early signaling of willingness to contribute and share the burden equitably helped groups in coping with threshold uncertainty.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WP64_threshold-uncertainty-public-goods.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment in its series GRI Working Papers with number 64.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Nov 2011
Handle: RePEc:lsg:lsgwps:wp64
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE

Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
Web page: http://www.lse.ac.uk/grantham.

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1984. "Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 171-193, July.
  2. Lange, Andreas & Löschel, Andreas & Vogt, Carsten & Ziegler, Andreas, 2010. "On the self-interested use of equity in international climate negotiations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 359-375, April.
  3. Michael A. Spencer & Stephen K. Swallow & Jason F. Shogren & John A. List, 2008. "Rebate Rules in Threshold Public Good Provision," NBER Working Papers 14559, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Koji Kotani & Kenta Tanaka & Shunsuke Managi, 2011. "Cooperative choice and its framing effect under threshold uncertainty in a provision point mechanism," Working Papers EMS_2011_05, Research Institute, International University of Japan.
  5. Lange, Andreas & Vogt, Carsten & Ziegler, Andreas, 2007. "On the importance of equity in international climate policy: An empirical analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 545-562, May.
  6. Bailey, Ralph W. & Eichberger, Jürgen & Kelsey, David, 2004. "Ambiguity and Public Good Provision in Large Societies," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-54, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  7. Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey & Burkhard Schipper, 2008. "Granny Versus Game Theorist: Ambiguity in Experimental Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 64(2), pages 333-362, March.
  8. Isaac, R. Mark & McCue, Kenneth F. & Plott, Charles R., "undated". "Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment," Working Papers 428, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  9. Rachel Croson & Melanie Marks, 2000. "Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(3), pages 239-259, March.
  10. Mark Bagnoli & Barton L. Lipman, 1989. "Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 583-601.
  11. Alessandro Tavoni & Astrid Dannenberg & Giorgos Kallis & Andreas L�schel, 2011. "Inequality, communication and the avoidance of disastrous climate change," GRI Working Papers 34, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
  12. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2002. "Strategic Complements, Substitutes, and Ambiguity: The Implications for Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 436-466, October.
  13. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  14. Rondeau, Daniel & Poe, Gregory L. & Schulze, William D., 2005. "VCM or PPM? A comparison of the performance of two voluntary public goods mechanisms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1581-1592, August.
  15. Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Camerer, Colin & Weber, Martin, 1992. "Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 325-370, October.
  17. Michael McBride, 2010. "Threshold uncertainty in discrete public good games: an experimental study," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 77-99, February.
  18. McBride, Michael, 2006. "Discrete public goods under threshold uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1181-1199, August.
  19. Nitzan, Shmuel & Romano, Richard E., 1990. "Private provision of a discrete public good with uncertain cost," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 357-370, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lsg:lsgwps:wp64. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (The GRI Administration)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.