Voting on contributions to a threshold public goods game: An experimental investigation
We introduce a binding unanimous voting rule to a public goods game with an uncertain threshold for the total group contribution. In a laboratory experiment we find that voting generates significantly higher total contributions than making individual voluntary contributions to the public good. Heterogeneity with regard to marginal costs of contribution makes coordination on the threshold value somewhat more di cult when voting, but apparently facilitates coordination when not voting. Homogeneous non-voting groups instead exhibit a breakdown of contributions commonly observed in linear public goods games, but unusual for a threshold setting. We also notice a preference for payoff symmetry over maximization of expected welfare in heterogeneous voting groups, which to a lesser extent also appears in nonvoting groups. Using a top-down rule, i.e., splitting the voting process into two separate votes on 1) total contribution and 2) individual contributions does not affect these results.
|Date of creation:||2014|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.wiwi.kit.edu/|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Gardner, Roy & von Hagen, Jurgen & Keser, Claudia, 2007.
"Budget processes: Theory and experimental evidence,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 279-295, May.
- Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Roy Gardner & Jürgen von Hagen & Claudia Keser, 1999. "Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-33, CIRANO.
- Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Gardner, Roy & von Hagen, Jürgen & Keser*, Claudia, 2004. "Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-57, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Roy Gardner & Juergen von Hagen & Claudia Keser, 2006. "Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Caepr Working Papers 2006-009, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
- Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Gardner, Roy J. & Hagen, Jürgen von & Keser, Claudia, 2004. "Budget processes : theory and experimental evidence," Papers 04-57, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Gardner, Roy & von Hagen, Jürgen & Keser, Claudia, 2000. "Budget processes: Theory and experimental evidence," ZEI Working Papers B 18-2000, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
- Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Gardner, Roy & Hagen, Jürgen von & Keser, Claudia, 2006. "Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 146, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Gardner, Roy J & Keser, Claudia & von Hagen, Jürgen, 2001. "Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2661, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Scott Barrett & Astrid Dannenberg, 2014. "On the Sensitivity of Collective Action to Uncertainty about Climate Tipping Points," CESifo Working Paper Series 4643, CESifo Group Munich.
- James Konow, 2003. "Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1188-1239, December.
- Stephan Kroll & Todd L. Cherry & Jason F. Shogren, 2007. "Voting, Punishment, And Public Goods," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(3), pages 557-570, 07.
- Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-291, March.
- Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
- Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Rachel Croson & Melanie Marks, 2000. "Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(3), pages 239-259, March.
- Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
- Sonnemans, Joep & Schram, Arthur & Offerman, Theo, 1998. "Public good provision and public bad prevention: The effect of framing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 143-161, January.
- Michael McBride, 2010. "Threshold uncertainty in discrete public good games: an experimental study," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 77-99, February.
- Magdalena Margreiter & Matthias Sutter & Dennis Dittrich, 2005. "Individual and Collective Choice and Voting in Common Pool Resource Problem with Heterogeneous Actors," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 32(2), pages 241-271, October.
- Croson, Rachel & Marks, Melanie, 2001. "The Effect of Recommended Contributions in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(2), pages 238-249, April.
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:kitwps:60. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.