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Challenging conventional wisdom: Experimental evidence on heterogeneity and coordination in avoiding a collective catastrophic event

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  • Waichman, Israel
  • Requate, Till
  • Karde, Markus
  • Milinski, Manfred

Abstract

Avoiding a catastrophic climate change event is a global public good characterized by several dimensions, notably heterogeneity between the parties involved. It is often argued that such heterogeneity between countries is a major obstacle to cooperative climate policy. We challenge this belief by experimentally simulating two important heterogeneities, in wealth and loss, when dangerous climate change occurs. We find that under loss heterogeneity the success rate in achieving sufficient mitigation to prevent catastrophic climate change is higher than with homogeneous parties. We also observe that neither endowment heterogeneity nor the combination of endowment and loss heterogeneities lead to significantly different success rates than with homogeneous parties. Our findings suggest that heterogeneities may facilitate rather than hinder successful international climate policy negotiations.

Suggested Citation

  • Waichman, Israel & Requate, Till & Karde, Markus & Milinski, Manfred, 2018. "Challenging conventional wisdom: Experimental evidence on heterogeneity and coordination in avoiding a collective catastrophic event," Economics Working Papers 2018-05, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cauewp:201805
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    Cited by:

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    2. Kreitmair, Ursula & Bower-Bir, Jacob, 2021. "Too different to solve climate change? Experimental evidence on the effects of production and benefit heterogeneity on collective action," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    global public good; climate change negotiation; collective-risk social dilemma; endowment heterogeneity; loss heterogeneity; focal point;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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