Give Everybody a Voice! The Power of Voting in a Public Goods Experiment with Externalities
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Rustam Romaniuc & Gregory J. DeAngelo & Dimitri Dubois & Bryan C. McCannon, 2019. "Intergroup inequality and the breakdown of prosociality," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 285-303, September.
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More about this item
Keywordsexperiment; Public Good; externality; voting;
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2015-01-31 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2015-01-31 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2015-01-31 (Positive Political Economics)
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