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The Impact of Voting on Tax Payments

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  • Ingrid Wahl
  • Stephan Muehlbacher
  • Erich Kirchler

Abstract

It is hypothesized that allowing taxpayers to participate in governmental decisions on the use of tax money would increase their cooperation and willingness to pay the tax due. In experiment 1 (N = 97), participants voted between different rules for a public good game and cooperated with their group by contributing to the group account. Cooperation in experiment 2 (N = 119) was defined as the participants' tax payments. The participants were allowed to vote on the use of their tax money. Additionally to the voting manipulation, the participants learned that either they themselves or others would benefit from tax-financed projects. The results from both experiments suggest that voting, i.e., participation, increases cooperation. Whether participants benefited themselves from tax-financed projects or whether others benefited from the projects did matter for participants' tax compliance. Furthermore, the results indicate that more procedural fairness was perceived when allowing for voting and that participants' trust in the governmental system mediates the relation of procedural fairness and tax payments. Copyright © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Ingrid Wahl & Stephan Muehlbacher & Erich Kirchler, 2010. "The Impact of Voting on Tax Payments," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 144-158, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:63:y:2010:i:1:p:144-158
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. James Alm & Erich Kirchler & Stephan Muehlbacher & Katharina Gangl & Eva Hofmann & Christoph Kogler & Maria Pollai, 2012. "Rethinking the Research Paradigms for Analysing Tax Compliance Behaviour," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(2), pages 33-40, July.
    2. Casal, Sandro & Kogler, Christoph & Mittone, Luigi & Kirchler, Erich, 2016. "Tax compliance depends on voice of taxpayers," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 141-150.
    3. Georgia Kaplanoglou & Vassilis T. Rapanos & Nikolaos Daskalakis, 2016. "Tax compliance behaviour during the crisis: the case of Greek SMEs," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 405-444, December.
    4. Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Antoine Malézieux & Jason F. Shogren, 2017. "L’évasion fiscale est-elle un trait de personnalité ?. Une évaluation empirique des déterminants psychologiques de la « morale fiscale »," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 68(5), pages 809-828.
    5. Stephan Muehlbacher & Erich Kirchler & Herbert Schwarzenberger, 2011. "Voluntary versus enforced tax compliance: empirical evidence for the “slippery slope” framework," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 89-97, August.
    6. Philipp Doerrenberg & Denvil Duncan & Clemens Fuest & Andreas Peichl, 2014. "Nice Guys Finish Last: Do Honest Taxpayers Face Higher Tax Rates?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 29-53, February.
    7. Christoph Engel & Bettina Rockenbach, 2014. "Give Everybody a Voice! The Power of Voting in a Public Goods Experiment with Externalities," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_16, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    8. Fredrik Carlsson & Olof Johansson-Stenman, 2010. "Why Do You Vote and Vote as You Do?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 495-516, November.
    9. James Alm & Chandler McClellan, 2012. "Tax Morale and Tax Compliance from the Firm's Perspective," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 1-17, February.
    10. Djawadi, Behnud Mir & Fahr, René, 2013. "The Impact of Tax Knowledge and Budget Spending Influence on Tax Compliance," IZA Discussion Papers 7255, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    11. Kaplanoglou, Georgia & Rapanos, Vassilis T., 2015. "Why do people evade taxes? New experimental evidence from Greece," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 21-32.
    12. Libman Alexander & Schultz André & Graeber Thomas, 2016. "Tax Return as a Political Statement," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 377-445, July.
    13. Semjén, András, 2017. "Az adózói magatartás különféle magyarázatai
      [Various explanations for tax compliance]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 140-184.
    14. repec:eee:jeeman:v:86:y:2017:i:c:p:48-67 is not listed on IDEAS

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