Centralized common pool management and local community participation
We use common-pool resource experiments to explore whether allowing resource users to vote on a natural resource management institution’s incentive structure enhances the ef- ficiency of resource use. We hypothesize that voting enables users to communicate their willingness to limit excess resource exploitation. Compared to games in which appropriate incentives are imposed exogenously, behavior is more cooperative conditional on a majority having voted for that structure. However, the effectiveness of this form of local community participation in resource management is limited as in more than half of the cases, only a minority votes in favor of implementing that incentive structure.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Postfach 10 01 31, 33501 Bielefeld|
Web page: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Agrawal, Arun & Gibson, Clark C., 1999. "Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 629-649, April.
- Keser, C. & Gardner, R., 1994.
"Strategic Behavior of Experienced Subjects in a Common Pool Resource Game,"
94-009, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
- Claudia Keser & Roy Gardner, 1999. "Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(2), pages 241-252.
- Wit, Jorgen, 1999. "Social Learning in a Common Interest Voting Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 131-156, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:335. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bettina Weingarten)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.