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Centralized common pool management and local community participation

Author

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  • Vyrastekova, Jana

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • van Soest, Daan

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract

We use common-pool resource experiments to explore whether allowing resource users to vote on a natural resource management institution’s incentive structure enhances the ef- ficiency of resource use. We hypothesize that voting enables users to communicate their willingness to limit excess resource exploitation. Compared to games in which appropriate incentives are imposed exogenously, behavior is more cooperative conditional on a majority having voted for that structure. However, the effectiveness of this form of local community participation in resource management is limited as in more than half of the cases, only a minority votes in favor of implementing that incentive structure.
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Suggested Citation

  • Vyrastekova, Jana & van Soest, Daan, 2017. "Centralized common pool management and local community participation," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 335, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:335
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Claudia Keser & Roy Gardner, 1999. "Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(2), pages 241-252.
    2. Agrawal, Arun & Gibson, Clark C., 1999. "Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 629-649, April.
    3. Wit, Jorgen, 1999. "Social Learning in a Common Interest Voting Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 131-156, January.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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