Centralized Common-Pool Management and Local Community Participation
We use common-pool resource experiments to explore whether allowing resource users to vote on a natural resource management institution’s incentive structure enhances the ef- ficiency of resource use. We hypothesize that voting enables users to communicate their willingness to limit excess resource exploitation. Compared to games in which appropriate incentives are imposed exogenously, behavior is more cooperative conditional on a majority having voted for that structure. However, the effectiveness of this form of local community participation in resource management is limited as in more than half of the cases, only a minority votes in favor of implementing that incentive structure.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wit, Jorgen, 1999. "Social Learning in a Common Interest Voting Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 131-156, January.
- Agrawal, Arun & Gibson, Clark C., 1999. "Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 629-649, April.
- Keser, C. & Gardner, R., 1994.
"Strategic Behavior of Experienced Subjects in a Common Pool Resource Game,"
94-009, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
- Claudia Keser & Roy Gardner, 1999. "Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 241-252.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:79:y:2003:i:4:p:500-514. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.