Strategic Behavior of Experienced Subjects in a Common Pool Resource Game
This paper describes the results of an experiment applying the strategy method to analyze the behavior of subjects in an 8-player common pool resource (CPR) game. The CPR game consists of a constituent game played for 20 periods. The CPR game has a unique optimum and a unique subgame perfect equilibrium; the latter involves overinvestment in the appropriation from the CPR. Sixteen students, all experienced in game theory, were recruited to play the CPR game over the course of 6 weeks. In the first phase of the experiment, they played the CPR game on-line 3 times. In the second phase of the experiment, the tournament phase, they designed strategies which were then played against each other. At the aggregate level, subgame perfect equilibrium organizes the data fairly well. At the individual level, however, fewer than 5% of subjects play in accordance with the game equilibrium prediction.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1994|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Indiana University, Center for Econometric Model Research, Department of Economics; Bloomington, IN 47405.|
Web page: http://www.indiana.edu/~econweb/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:indian:94-009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.