IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/joepsy/v32y2011i1p93-102.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Strategy versus sincerity in mean voting

Author

Listed:
  • Marchese, Carla
  • Montefiori, Marcello

Abstract

This paper focuses on the mean vote procedure for choosing the quantity of a public good, a social choice rule that selects the mean of the quantities voted for. The available theoretical models of mean voting give rise to conflicting predictions about the extent of the strategic bias that might arise in the individual vote. An experiment has been run in order to assess whether the participants disclose their (induced) preferences in voting or whether they strategically manipulate their vote, and in the latter case, which variables impact upon the likelihood of strategic bias and to what extent.

Suggested Citation

  • Marchese, Carla & Montefiori, Marcello, 2011. "Strategy versus sincerity in mean voting," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 93-102, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:32:y:2011:i:1:p:93-102
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-4870(10)00137-6
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2004. "Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 103-116, October.
    2. Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2005. "Protecting Minorities through the Average Voting Rule," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 169-199, May.
    3. Carla Marchese & Marcello Montefiori, 2007. "Meccanismi di voto e scelte collettive: un'analisi sperimentale," STUDI ECONOMICI, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2007(93), pages 33-52.
    4. Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2004. "Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation for the average voting rule," IDEP Working Papers 0403, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2011. "Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation: the average vote example," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 497-513, December.
    2. Bo Chen & Bin Zhang & Hua-qing Wu, 2015. "Misreporting behaviour in iterated prisoner's dilemma game with combined trust strategy," International Journal of Systems Science, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(1), pages 31-43, January.
    3. Fang-Fang Tang & Yongsheng Xu, 2021. "Corruption in Organizations: Some General Formulations and (In-)Corruptibility Results," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 49-57, December.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12477 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Puppe, Clemens & Rollmann, Jana, 2021. "Mean versus median voting in multi-dimensional budget allocation problems. A laboratory experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 309-330.
    6. Harsh V. Pant, 2013. "India in Afghanistan," Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, , vol. 17(1), pages 103-127, June.
    7. Matias Nunez & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2016. "Unanimous Implementation: A Case For Approval Mechanisms," Working Papers hal-01270275, HAL.
    8. Puppe, Clemens & Rollmann, Jana, 2022. "Participation in voting over budget allocations: A field experiment," Working Paper Series in Economics 155, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    9. Christoph Engel & Bettina Rockenbach, 2014. "Give Everybody a Voice! The Power of Voting in a Public Goods Experiment with Externalities," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_16, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Carla Marchese & Marcello Montefiori, 2008. "Voting the public expenditure: an experiment," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 020, University of Siena.
    2. Marchese, Carla & Montefiori, Marcello, 2005. "Mean voting rule and strategical behavior: an experiment," POLIS Working Papers 49, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    3. Bo Chen & Bin Zhang & Hua-qing Wu, 2015. "Misreporting behaviour in iterated prisoner's dilemma game with combined trust strategy," International Journal of Systems Science, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(1), pages 31-43, January.
    4. Yamamura, Hirofumi, 2016. "Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: An application of the minimax theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 48-57.
    5. Michael Müller & Clemens Puppe, 2023. "Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 131-151, April.
    6. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12477 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2005. "Protecting Minorities through the Average Voting Rule," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 169-199, May.
    8. K. Kıvanç Aköz & K. Peren Arın & Christina Zenker, 2022. "On the labor market effects of salience of ethnic/racial disputes," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(2), pages 348-361, April.
    9. Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 533-544, July.
    10. Hirofumi Yamamura & Ryo Kawasaki, 2013. "Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 815-832, March.
    11. Puppe, Clemens & Rollmann, Jana, 2021. "Mean versus median voting in multi-dimensional budget allocation problems. A laboratory experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 309-330.
    12. Puppe, Clemens & Rollmann, Jana, 2022. "Participation in voting over budget allocations: A field experiment," Working Paper Series in Economics 155, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    13. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2014. "Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 26-39.
    14. Herman Demeze & Issofa Moyouwou & Roland Pongou, 2016. "The Welfare Economics of Tactical Voting in Democracies: A Partial Identification Equilibrium Analysis," Working Papers 1611e, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    15. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 828.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    16. Matias Nunez & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2016. "Unanimous Implementation: A Case For Approval Mechanisms," Working Papers hal-01270275, HAL.
    17. Louis, Philippos & Núñez, Matías & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2023. "Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 116-151.
    18. Philippos Louis & Matías Núñez & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2022. "The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(641), pages 326-360.
    19. Müller, Michael & Puppe, Clemens, 2020. "Strategy-proofness and responsiveness imply minimal participation," Working Paper Series in Economics 138, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    20. Demeze, Herman & Moyouwou, Issofa & Pongou, Roland, 2016. "The Welfare Economics of Tactical Voting in Democracies: A Partial Identification Equilibrium Analysis," MPRA Paper 70607, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2011. "Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation: the average vote example," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 497-513, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Experiment Voting rule Public good;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:32:y:2011:i:1:p:93-102. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/joep .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.