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The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement

Author

Listed:
  • Philippos Louis
  • Matías Núñez
  • Dimitrios Xefteris

Abstract

Collective choice mechanisms are used by groups to reach decisions in the presence of diverging preferences. But can the employed mechanism affect the degree of post-decision actual agreement (i.e., preference homogeneity) within a group? And if so, which are the features of the choice mechanisms that matter? Since it is difficult to address these questions in natural settings, we employ a theory-driven experiment where, after the group collectively decides on an issue, individual preferences can be properly elicited. We find that decision mechanisms that promote consensual behaviour generate substantially higher levels of post-decision actual agreement compared to outcome-wise identical procedures that incentivise subjects to exaggerate their differences.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippos Louis & Matías Núñez & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2022. "The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(641), pages 326-360.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:132:y:2022:i:641:p:326-360.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ej/ueab057
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    Cited by:

    1. Louis, Philippos & Núñez, Matías & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2023. "Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 116-151.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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