Protecting Minorities through the Average Voting Rule
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00200.x
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- Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2003. "Protecting minorities through the average voting rules," IDEP Working Papers 0303, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Philippos Louis & Matias Núñez & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2018. "Beyond Outcomes: Experimental Evidence on the Value of Agreement," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 05-2018, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- Bo Chen & Bin Zhang & Hua-qing Wu, 2015. "Misreporting behaviour in iterated prisoner's dilemma game with combined trust strategy," International Journal of Systems Science, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(1), pages 31-43, January.
- Puppe, Clemens & Rollmann, Jana, 2021. "Mean versus median voting in multi-dimensional budget allocation problems. A laboratory experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 309-330.
- Puppe, Clemens & Rollmann, Jana, 2022. "Participation in voting over budget allocations: A field experiment," Working Paper Series in Economics 155, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
- Louis, Philippos & Núñez, Matías & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2023. "Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 116-151.
- Marchese, Carla & Montefiori, Marcello, 2011. "Strategy versus sincerity in mean voting," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 93-102, February.
- Müller, Michael & Puppe, Clemens, 2020. "Strategy-proofness and responsiveness imply minimal participation," Working Paper Series in Economics 138, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
- Bryan McCannon, 2009. "Can the majority lose the election?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(4), pages 305-317, December.
- Carla Marchese & Marcello Montefiori, 2008. "Voting the public expenditure: an experiment," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 020, University of Siena.
- Haris Aziz & Alexander Lam & Barton E. Lee & Toby Walsh, 2021. "Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location," Papers 2111.01566, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
- Philippos Louis & Matías Núñez & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2022.
"The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement,"
The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(641), pages 326-360.
- Philippos Louis & Matias Núñez & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2019. "The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 04-2019, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- Philippos Louis & Matias Nunez & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement," Post-Print halshs-03324190, HAL.
- Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2004. "Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation for the average voting rule," IDEP Working Papers 0403, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.
- Michael Müller & Clemens Puppe, 2023. "Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 131-151, April.
- Yamamura, Hirofumi, 2016. "Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: An application of the minimax theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 48-57.
- Marchese, Carla & Montefiori, Marcello, 2005. "Mean voting rule and strategical behavior: an experiment," POLIS Working Papers 49, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
- Hirofumi Yamamura & Ryo Kawasaki, 2013. "Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 815-832, March.
- K. Kıvanç Aköz & K. Peren Arın & Christina Zenker, 2022. "On the labor market effects of salience of ethnic/racial disputes," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(2), pages 348-361, April.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
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