Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation for the average voting rule
The average voting procedure reflects the weighted average of expressed opinions in [0,1]. Participants typically behave strategically. We evaluate the discrepancy between the average taste and the average vote. If the population is sufficiently large, it is possible to contruct approximations of both the average vote and the average taste which may be readily compared. We construct upper and lower bounds for the limit average vote that depend on the limit average taste. If the average taste is central enough, the range of possible values for the average voting outcome is narrower than the corresponding range for majority voting. For instance, if the average taste is at 1/2, the limit equilibrium outcome is this value plus or minus roughly .2, whereas the median maybe anywhere in the [0,1] interval. Results are robust to the introduction of incomplete information.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.idep-fr.org/Email:
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Anke Gerber, 1998. "Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 445-454.
- Rath, Kali P, 1992. "A Direct Proof of the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 427-33, July.
- H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
- Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-41, November.
- Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2003.
"Protecting minorities through the average voting rules,"
IDEP Working Papers
0303, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.
- Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2005. "Protecting Minorities through the Average Voting Rule," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 169-199, 05.
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
- Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
- Bilodeau, M., 1990.
"Tax Earmarking and Separate School Financing,"
Cahiers de recherche
90-14, Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iep:wpidep:0403. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Yves Doazan)The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Yves Doazan to update the entry or send us the correct address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.