Voting the public expenditure: an experiment
This paper considers the problem of voting about the quantity of a public good. An experiment has been run in order to test the extent of the strategic bias that arises in the individual vote when the social choice rule is to select the mean of the quantities voted for; conflicting theoretical predictions are available in the literature on this purpose. The political implications of the mean rule and its effects upon efficiency are also discussed.
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- Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2005.
"Protecting Minorities through the Average Voting Rule,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 169-199, 05.
- Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2003. "Protecting minorities through the average voting rules," IDEP Working Papers 0303, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.
- Ehlers,L. & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2000.
"Threshold Strategy-Proofness: On Manipulability in Large Voting Problems,"
038, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2004. "Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 103-116, October.
- H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
- Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2004. "Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation for the average voting rule," IDEP Working Papers 0403, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.
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