Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation: the average vote example
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Matías Núñez & Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations ," Working Papers hal-01340317, HAL.
- Yamamura, Hirofumi, 2016. "Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: An application of the minimax theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 48-57.
More about this item
KeywordsAverage voting; Nash equilibrium; Strategic bias; Weight; D74; H41; I22;
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
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