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Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions

Author

Listed:
  • Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin

    (Department of Economics and IVIE, University of Alicante, E-03080 Alicante, Spain)

  • Anke Gerber

    (IMW, University of Bielefeld, Postfach 10 01 31, D-33501 Bielefeld, Germany)

Abstract

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme positions of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise between these two extremes.

Suggested Citation

  • Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Anke Gerber, 1998. "Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 445-454.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:3:p:445-454
    Note: Received: 28 May 1996 / Accepted: 5 February 1997
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2008. "Party Formation in Single-Issue Politics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 974-1005, September.
    2. Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2005. "Protecting Minorities through the Average Voting Rule," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 169-199, May.
    3. Andrei Gomberg & Francisco Marhuenda & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, 2007. "Endogenous platforms: the case of many parties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 223-249, January.
    4. Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2011. "Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation: the average vote example," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 497-513, December.
    5. Andrei Gomberg & Francisco Marhuenda & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, 2004. "A model of endogenous political party platforms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(2), pages 373-394, August.
    6. Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Christian Schultz, 2005. "Public Funding of Political Parties," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(5), pages 781-791, December.
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12477 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Regis Renault & A. Trannoy, 1999. "Protecting minorities through voting rules," THEMA Working Papers 99-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    9. Andrei M. Gomberg & Francisco Marhuenda & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, 2016. "Endogenous party platforms: ‘stochastic’ membership," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(4), pages 839-866, October.
    10. Bowen, T. Renee & Zahran, Zaki, 2012. "On dynamic compromise," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 391-419.
    11. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Elena Manzoni & Carlos Pimienta, 2014. "Proportional Representation with Uncertainty," Working Papers 288, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2014.
    12. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2002. "Party Formation Incollective Decision-Making," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 844, The University of Melbourne.
    13. Humberto Llavador, 2006. "Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 55-81, August.
    14. Arnaud Dellis, 2013. "The two-party system under alternative voting procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 263-284, January.
    15. Dhillon, Amrita, 2004. "Political Parties And Coalition Formation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 697, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    16. Ignacio Ortuño Ortín, 1999. "- A Model Of Voting With Incomplete Information And Opinion Polls," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-25, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    17. Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2004. "Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation for the average voting rule," IDEP Working Papers 0403, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.

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