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Protecting minorities through voting rules

Author

Listed:
  • Regis Renault
  • A. Trannoy

Abstract

With too much disparity in opinions, minorities may question the legitimacy of majority voting and indermine the unity of the group through political violence or civil disobedience. Properties of an average vvoting rule are investigated here, with particular attention to its ability to protect minorities. Voters typically misrepresent their tastes by taking extreme stands. Conditions ensuring that average voting favors a minority more than the majority voting are derived. They are used to show that in actual applications of average voting, crucial factors are the correlation between wealth and tastes and the progressiveness of taxes.
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Suggested Citation

  • Regis Renault & A. Trannoy, 1999. "Protecting minorities through voting rules," THEMA Working Papers 99-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:99-04
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    File URL: http://www.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents//99-04trannoy.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Anke Gerber, 1998. "Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 445-454.
    2. Grossman, G-M & Helpman, E, 1996. "Electoral Competition with Policy Compromise," Papers 181, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    3. Patrick Bolton & Gérard Roland, 1997. "The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1057-1090.
    4. Warr, Peter G., 1983. "The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 207-211.
    5. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    6. Bergstrom, Ted C, 1979. " When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 81(2), pages 216-226.
    7. Bagnoli, Mark & McKee, Michael, 1991. "Controlling the Game: Political Sponsors and Bureaus," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 229-247, Fall.
    8. Michael McKee, 1988. "Political competition and the Roman Catholic schools: Ontario, Canada," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 57-67, January.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid

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