Protecting minorities through voting rules
With too much disparity in opinions, minorities may question the legitimacy of majority voting and indermine the unity of the group through political violence or civil disobedience. Properties of an average vvoting rule are investigated here, with particular attention to its ability to protect minorities. Voters typically misrepresent their tastes by taking extreme stands. Conditions ensuring that average voting favors a minority more than the majority voting are derived. They are used to show that in actual applications of average voting, crucial factors are the correlation between wealth and tastes and the progressiveness of taxes.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 33, boulevard du port - 95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex|
Phone: 33 1 34 25 60 63
Fax: 33 1 34 25 62 33
Web page: http://thema.u-cergy.fr
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Grossman, G-M & Helpman, E, 1996.
"Electoral Competition with Policy Compromise,"
181, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Michael McKee, 1988. "Political competition and the Roman Catholic schools: Ontario, Canada," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 57-67, January.
- Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
- Patrick Bolton & Gérard Roland, 1997. "The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1057-1090.
- Bergstrom, Ted C, 1979. " When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 81(2), pages 216-26.
- Bagnoli, Mark & McKee, Michael, 1991. "Controlling the Game: Political Sponsors and Bureaus," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 229-47, Fall.
- Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Anke Gerber, 1998. "Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 445-454.
- Warr, Peter G., 1983. "The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 207-211.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:99-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Stefania Marcassa)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.