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Protecting minorities through voting rules

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Listed:
  • Regis Renault
  • A. Trannoy

Abstract

With too much disparity in opinions, minorities may question the legitimacy of majority voting and indermine the unity of the group through political violence or civil disobedience. Properties of an average vvoting rule are investigated here, with particular attention to its ability to protect minorities. Voters typically misrepresent their tastes by taking extreme stands. Conditions ensuring that average voting favors a minority more than the majority voting are derived. They are used to show that in actual applications of average voting, crucial factors are the correlation between wealth and tastes and the progressiveness of taxes.
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Suggested Citation

  • Regis Renault & A. Trannoy, 1999. "Protecting minorities through voting rules," THEMA Working Papers 99-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:99-04
    as

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    File URL: http://www.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents//99-04trannoy.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid

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