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Agriculture production versus biodiversity protection: The impact of North-South unconditional transfers

Author

Listed:
  • Stéphanie Aulong

    (BRGM - Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières (BRGM))

  • C. Figuières

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

  • S. Thoyer

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explore whether international income transfers can improve or worsen the global level of biodiversity and global social welfare by changing the relative contributions to biodiversity protection and to agricultural production. Because of the public good nature of biodiversity, Warr's neutrality theorem suggests that such transfers may have no effects at all (Warr, 1983). A model is developed, based on the simplifying assumption that northern countries have little biodiversity whereas southern countries are endowed with natural capital in the form of (generally unspoilt) biodiversity-rich land. Southern countries allocate optimally land and capital to two competing productive activities, agriculture and eco-tourism. When transfers are organized from the North to the South, we show that Warr's neutrality theorem collapses. Transfers can either reduce or increase the natural capital in the South, depending on some empirically verifiable hypotheses concerning the characteristics of the eco-tourism and agricultural production functions. In addition, we demonstrate that welfare improvements can be obtained even with reductions in the level of biodiversity. Research Highlights Could international income transfers improve the levels of biodiversity and welfare? A model is developed with a biodiversity-poor North and an ecosystem-rich South. We show that North-South transfers can either reduce or increase the natural capital. And that welfare improvements can be obtained even with reductions in biodiversity.

Suggested Citation

  • Stéphanie Aulong & C. Figuières & S. Thoyer, 2011. "Agriculture production versus biodiversity protection: The impact of North-South unconditional transfers," Post-Print hal-00601787, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00601787
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.03.011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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