Protecting minorities through the average voting rules
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- Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2005. "Protecting Minorities through the Average Voting Rule," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 169-199, May.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Marchese, Carla & Montefiori, Marcello, 2011. "Strategy versus sincerity in mean voting," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 93-102, February.
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- Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2004. "Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation for the average voting rule," IDEP Working Papers 0403, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.
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More about this item
Keywordsminority; majority voting; public goods; Nash equilibrium.;
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-02-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2005-02-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2005-02-20 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2005-02-20 (Positive Political Economics)
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