Political Parties And Coalition Formation
This chapter gives a flavour of recent theoretical work on coalition formation and political parties. I survey recent work on both pre-election coalition formation and post election coalition (or government) formation. A number of alternative rationales for the formation of parties are compared with the help of some illustrative examples.
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- Martin J Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2010.
"Party formation in collective decision-making,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
506439000000000050, David K. Levine.
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1995-01, McMaster University.
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- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997.
"An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
- Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Anke Gerber, 1998. "Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 445-454.
- Massimo Morelli, 2001.
"Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems,"
Economics Working Papers
0018, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Massimo Morelli, 2004. "Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 829-853.
- Morelli, Massimo, 1998. "Party Formation and Policy Outcomes Under Different Electoral Systems," Staff General Research Papers 1242, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- D Austen-Smith, 1983. "The spatial theory of electoral competition: instability, institutions, and information," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 1(4), pages 439-459, August.
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"Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game,"
1036, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 2002. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 49-87, March.
- Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993.
"Equilibrium Binding Agreements,"
21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
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