IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Political Parties And Coalition Formation


  • Dhillon, Amrita

    (Department of Economics, University of Warwick,)


This chapter gives a flavour of recent theoretical work on coalition formation and political parties. I survey recent work on both pre-election coalition formation and post election coalition (or government) formation. A number of alternative rationales for the formation of parties are compared with the help of some illustrative examples.

Suggested Citation

  • Dhillon, Amrita, 2004. "Political Parties And Coalition Formation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 697, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:697

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Krehbiel, Keith, 1993. "Where's the Party?," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(02), pages 235-266, April.
    2. Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Anke Gerber, 1998. "Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 445-454.
    3. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
    4. Massimo Morelli, 2004. "Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 829-853.
    5. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
    6. repec:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:01:p:34-47_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
    8. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2002. "Party Formation Incollective Decision-Making," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 844, The University of Melbourne.
    9. D Austen-Smith, 1983. "The spatial theory of electoral competition: instability, institutions, and information," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 1(4), pages 439-459, August.
    10. Andrei Gomberg & Francisco Marhuenda & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, 2004. "A model of endogenous political party platforms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(2), pages 373-394, August.
    11. Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 2002. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 49-87, March.
    12. repec:cup:apsrev:v:82:y:1988:i:02:p:405-422_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(02), pages 405-422, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tomas Sjöström, 2013. "Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, chapter 7, pages 129-181 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Hansen, Emanuel, 2016. "Political Competition with Endogenous Party Formation and Citizen Activists," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145923, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Daniel Ladley & James Rockey, 2010. "Party Formation and Competition," Discussion Papers in Economics 10/17, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
    4. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2004. "Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation," Working Papers 2004.98, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    5. Dhillon, Amrita & Rossetto, Silvia, 2009. "Corporate Control and Multiple Large Shareholders," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 891, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.

    More about this item


    Political Parties ; Coalition formation ; uni-dimensional ; multi-dimensional ; pre-electoral coalitions ; legislative coalitions;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:697. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Margaret Nash). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.