Meccanismi di voto e scelte collettive: un'analisi sperimentale
Voting Rule and Collective Choice: An Experiment (by Carla Marchese, Marcello Montefiori) - This paper concerns the problem of collective choices and misrepresentation of preferences. Even if many mechanism have been suggested in the literature, the problem of free riding and strategic behaviour seems to be unavoidable. By an experiment we have studied individual behaviour testing two different voting rules: the mean voting and the median voting. Our aim is to investigate the individual voting process in order to assess what are the main determinants of preferences’ misrepresentation. In particular the role of experience and information in affecting the strategic behaviour are considered. JEL Classification: C91, D72
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Volume (Year): 2007/93 (2007)
Issue (Month): 93 ()
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