Impossibility Results for Parametrized Notions of Efficiency and Strategyproofness in Exchange Economies
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|Date of creation:||2013|
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- David A. Smith, 1999. "Manipulability measures of common social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 639-661.
- Andrew Postlewaite, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 255-262.
- Aumann, R. J. & Peleg, B., 1974. "A note on Gale's example," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 209-211, August.
- Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 73-93, 08.
- Maus,Stefan & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2005.
"Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability,"
009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Maus,Stefan & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2004.
"Minimal Manipulability: Anonymity and Unanimity,"
026, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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