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Wonki Jo Cho

Personal Details

First Name:Wonki
Middle Name:Jo
Last Name:Cho
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pch1535
https://sites.google.com/site/wonkijocho/

Affiliation

College of Economics
Sogang University

Seoul, South Korea
https://econ.sogang.ac.kr/
RePEc:edi:ccsogkr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Wonki Jo Cho & Alejandro Saporiti, 2015. "Incentives, Fairness, and Efficiency in Group Identification," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1501, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  2. Wonki Jo Cho, 2013. "Impossibility Results for Parametrized Notions of Efficiency and Strategyproofness in Exchange Economies," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1314, Economics, The University of Manchester.

Articles

  1. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2022. "How to add apples and oranges: Aggregating performances of different nature," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 222-244.
  2. Cho, Wonki Jo & Hafalir, Isa E. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2022. "Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
  3. Wonki Jo Cho & Alejandro Saporiti, 2020. "Group identification with (incomplete) preferences," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(1), pages 170-189, February.
  4. Cho, Wonki Jo & Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2020. "Group identification: An integrated approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 171-181.
  5. Cho, Wonki Jo & Park, Chang Woo, 2018. "Fractional group identification," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 66-75.
  6. Wonki Jo Cho, 2018. "Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 137-162, June.
  7. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2018. "Fairness in group identification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 35-40.
  8. Cho, Wonki Jo & Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2017. "Multinary group identification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
  9. Wonki Jo Cho & Battal Doğan, 2017. "Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 991-1014, November.
  10. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 168-177.
  11. Cho, Wonki Jo & Doğan, Battal, 2016. "Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 8-12.
  12. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 14-25.
  13. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2014. "Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 26-39.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Wonki Jo Cho & Alejandro Saporiti, 2015. "Incentives, Fairness, and Efficiency in Group Identification," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1501, Economics, The University of Manchester.

    Cited by:

    1. Federico Fioravanti & Fernando Tohmé, 2021. "Alternative Axioms in Group Identification Problems," Journal of Classification, Springer;The Classification Society, vol. 38(2), pages 353-362, July.
    2. Federico Fioravanti & Fernando Tohmé, 2020. "Asking Infinite Voters ‘Who is a J?’: Group Identification Problems in ℕ$\mathbb {N}$," Journal of Classification, Springer;The Classification Society, vol. 37(1), pages 58-65, April.
    3. Balázs Sziklai, 2018. "How to identify experts in a community?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 155-173, March.

  2. Wonki Jo Cho, 2013. "Impossibility Results for Parametrized Notions of Efficiency and Strategyproofness in Exchange Economies," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1314, Economics, The University of Manchester.

    Cited by:

    1. Harless, Patrick, 2016. "Solidarity in preference aggregation: Improving on a status quo," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 73-87.
    2. Wang, Xu & Zhu, Lei & Liu, Pengfei, 2021. "Manipulation via endowments: Quantifying the influence of market power on the emission trading scheme," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    3. Alva, Samson & Manjunath, Vikram, 2020. "The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 15-29.
    4. Harless, Patrick, 2015. "Solidarity with respect to small changes in preferences in public good economies with single-peaked preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 81-86.

Articles

  1. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2022. "How to add apples and oranges: Aggregating performances of different nature," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 222-244.

    Cited by:

    1. Ricardo Martínez & Juan D Moreno Ternero, 2022. "An axiomatic approach towards pandemic performance indicators," ThE Papers 22/12, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..

  2. Wonki Jo Cho & Alejandro Saporiti, 2020. "Group identification with (incomplete) preferences," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(1), pages 170-189, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Yang, Yongjie & Dimitrov, Dinko, 2023. "Group control for consent rules with consecutive qualifications," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 1-7.

  3. Cho, Wonki Jo & Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2020. "Group identification: An integrated approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 171-181.

    Cited by:

    1. Mukashov, A., 2023. "Parameter uncertainty in policy planning models: Using portfolio management methods to choose optimal policies under world market volatility," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 187-202.
    2. Christopher P. Chambers & Alan D. Miller, 2023. "Multiple Adjusted Quantiles," Papers 2305.06354, arXiv.org.
    3. Yang, Yongjie & Dimitrov, Dinko, 2023. "Group control for consent rules with consecutive qualifications," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 1-7.

  4. Cho, Wonki Jo & Park, Chang Woo, 2018. "Fractional group identification," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 66-75.

    Cited by:

    1. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2018. "Fairness in group identification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 35-40.
    2. Susumu Cato & Stéphane Gonzalez & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2022. "Approval voting versus proportional threshold methods: so far and yet so near," Working Papers halshs-03858356, HAL.
    3. Federico Fioravanti, 2024. "Fuzzy Classification Aggregation," Papers 2402.17620, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    4. Federico Fioravanti & Fernando Tohm'e, 2019. "Fuzzy Group Identification Problems," Papers 1912.05540, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
    5. Federico Fioravanti, 2024. "Fuzzy Classification Aggregation," Working Papers 312, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).

  5. Wonki Jo Cho, 2018. "Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 137-162, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Peng & Zeng, Huaxia, 2019. "Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 176-194.
    2. William Thomson, 2018. "On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(1), pages 67-99, June.
    3. Sulagna Dasgupta & Debasis Mishra, 2022. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 651-664, December.
    4. Honda, Edward, 2021. "A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    5. Tom Demeulemeester & Juan S. Pereyra, 2022. "Rawlsian Assignments," Papers 2207.02930, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    6. Yoshio Sano & Ping Zhan, 2021. "Extended Random Assignment Mechanisms on a Family of Good Sets," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 1-30, December.
    7. Alva, Samson & Manjunath, Vikram, 2020. "The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 15-29.
    8. Mennle, Timo & Seuken, Sven, 2021. "Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    9. Andrew McLennan & Shino Takayama & Yuki Tamura, 2024. "An Efficient, Computationally Tractable School Choice Mechanism," Discussion Papers Series 668, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.

  6. Cho, Wonki Jo & Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2017. "Multinary group identification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.

    Cited by:

    1. Alcantud, José Carlos R. & Laruelle, Annick, 2018. "Collective identity functions with status quo," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 159-166.
    2. Federico Fioravanti & Fernando Tohmé, 2021. "Alternative Axioms in Group Identification Problems," Journal of Classification, Springer;The Classification Society, vol. 38(2), pages 353-362, July.
    3. John Craven, 2023. "Self-designation and group allocation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 121-133, January.
    4. Cho, Wonki Jo & Park, Chang Woo, 2018. "Fractional group identification," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 66-75.
    5. Cho, Wonki Jo & Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2020. "Group identification: An integrated approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 171-181.
    6. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2018. "Fairness in group identification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 35-40.
    7. Susumu Cato & Stéphane Gonzalez & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2022. "Approval voting versus proportional threshold methods: so far and yet so near," Working Papers halshs-03858356, HAL.
    8. Federico Fioravanti & Fernando Tohmé, 2020. "Asking Infinite Voters ‘Who is a J?’: Group Identification Problems in ℕ$\mathbb {N}$," Journal of Classification, Springer;The Classification Society, vol. 37(1), pages 58-65, April.

  7. Wonki Jo Cho & Battal Doğan, 2017. "Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 991-1014, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Minoru Kitahara & Yasunori Okumura, 2021. "Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 971-987, December.

  8. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 168-177.

    Cited by:

    1. Chatterji, Shurojit & Zeng, Huaxia, 2018. "On random social choice functions with the tops-only property," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 413-435.
    2. Liu, Peng, 2020. "Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 565-584.
    3. Liu, Peng, 2020. "Local vs. global strategy-proofness: A new equivalence result for ordinal mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    4. Kumar, Ujjwal & Roy, Souvik & Sen, Arunava & Yadav, Sonal & Zeng, Huaxia, 2021. "Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 299-308.
    5. Liu, Peng & Zeng, Huaxia, 2019. "Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 176-194.
    6. Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2021. "A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    7. Karmokar, Madhuparna & Roy, Souvik, 2020. "The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules," MPRA Paper 103494, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Zhang, Jun, 2020. "When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 251-266.
    9. Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2022. "On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    10. Youngsub Chun & Kiyong Yun, 2020. "Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 667-687, April.
    11. Harless, Patrick, 2016. "Solidarity in preference aggregation: Improving on a status quo," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 73-87.
    12. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 14-25.
    13. Chatterji, Shurojit & Zeng, Huaxia, 2019. "Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 25-105.
    14. William Thomson, 2023. "Where should your daughter go to college? An axiomatic analysis," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(1), pages 313-330, January.
    15. Sulagna Dasgupta & Debasis Mishra, 2020. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model," Papers 2009.13104, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    16. Aziz, Haris & Brandl, Florian & Brandt, Felix & Brill, Markus, 2018. "On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 1-18.
    17. Madhuparna Karmokar & Souvik Roy, 2023. "The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(1), pages 111-152, July.
    18. Altuntaş, Açelya & Phan, William & Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Some characterizations of Generalized Top Trading Cycles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 156-181.
    19. Haris Aziz & Yoichi Kasajima, 2017. "Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 255-275, August.
    20. Mennle, Timo & Seuken, Sven, 2021. "Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    21. Muto, Nozomu & Sato, Shin, 2017. "An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 1-15.
    22. Cho, Wonki Jo & Doğan, Battal, 2016. "Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 8-12.
    23. Andrew McLennan & Shino Takayama & Yuki Tamura, 2024. "An Efficient, Computationally Tractable School Choice Mechanism," Discussion Papers Series 668, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.

  9. Cho, Wonki Jo & Doğan, Battal, 2016. "Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 8-12.

    Cited by:

    1. Aziz, Haris & Brandl, Florian, 2022. "The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 168-187.
    2. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 14-25.
    3. Alva, Samson & Manjunath, Vikram, 2020. "The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 15-29.
    4. Wonki Jo Cho, 2018. "Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 137-162, June.
    5. Andrew McLennan & Shino Takayama & Yuki Tamura, 2024. "An Efficient, Computationally Tractable School Choice Mechanism," Discussion Papers Series 668, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.

  10. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 14-25.

    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Peng, 2020. "Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 565-584.
    2. Liu, Peng & Zeng, Huaxia, 2019. "Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 176-194.
    3. Doğan, Battal & Doğan, Serhat & Yıldız, Kemal, 2018. "A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 178-200.

  11. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2014. "Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 26-39.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (1) 2015-01-31

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