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Rawlsian Assignments

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Pereyra

  • Tom Demeulemeester

Abstract

We study the assignment of indivisible goods to individuals without monetary transfers. Previous literature has mainly focused on efficiency and individually fair assignments; consequently, egalitarian concerns have been overlooked. Drawing inspiration from the allocation of apartments in housing cooperatives—where families prioritize egalitarianism in assignments—we introduce the concept of Rawlsian assignment. We demonstrate the uniqueness, efficiency and anonymity of the Rawlsian rule. Our findings are validated using cooperative housing preference data, showing significant improvements in egalitarian outcomes over both the probabilistic serial rule and the currently employed rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Pereyra & Tom Demeulemeester, 2024. "Rawlsian Assignments," Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers 2403, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
    • Handle: RePEc:mnt:wpaper:2403
    as

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    File URL: https://www2.um.edu.uy/fcee_papers/2020/Rawlsian_Assignments.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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