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When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?

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  • Gabriel Carroll

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  • Gabriel Carroll, 2012. "When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(2), pages 661-686, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:80:y:2012:i:2:p:661-686
    DOI: ECTA9454
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.3982/ECTA9454
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    Cited by:

    1. Sato, Shin, 2013. "A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 259-278.
    2. Haeringer, Guillaume & Hałaburda, Hanna, 2016. "Monotone strategyproofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 68-77.
    3. Mishra, Debasis & Pramanik, Anup & Roy, Souvik, 2016. "Local incentive compatibility with transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 149-165.
    4. Vianney Dequiedt & David Martimort, 2015. "Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2141-2182, July.
    5. Wonki Jo Cho & Alejandro Saporiti, 2015. "Incentives, Fairness, and Efficiency in Group Identification," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 1501, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    6. Harless, Patrick, 2015. "Solidarity with respect to small changes in preferences in public good economies with single-peaked preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 81-86.
    7. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo & Kojima, Fuhito, 2015. "Efficient assignment with interdependent values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 54-86.
    8. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 168-177.
    9. Rivas, Javier, 2015. "Mechanism design and bounded rationality: The case of type misreporting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 6-13.
    10. Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2017. "A Unified Characterization of Randomized Strategy-proof Rules," MPRA Paper 79363, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Mishra, Debasis, 2016. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 925-954.
    12. Harless, Patrick, 2016. "Solidarity in preference aggregation: Improving on a status quo," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 73-87.
    13. repec:hrv:faseco:34651704 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    15. Pycia, Marek & Ünver, M. Utku, 2015. "Decomposing random mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 21-33.
    16. Schottmüller, Christoph, 2015. "Adverse selection without single crossing: Monotone solutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 127-164.
    17. André Berger & Rudolf Müller & Seyed Hossein Naeemi, 2017. "Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 367-383, February.
    18. Ryan Tierney, 2016. "On the manipulability of efficient exchange rules," ISER Discussion Paper 0987, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    19. Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen & Huaxia Zeng, 2014. "A CHaracterization of Single-Peaked Preferences via Random Social Choice Functions," Working Papers 13-2014, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    20. repec:eee:gamebe:v:106:y:2017:i:c:p:1-15 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Chatterji, Shurojit & Sen, Arunava & Zeng, Huaxia, 2016. "A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.

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