On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.012
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More about this item
Keywords
Augmentation-proofness; Endowment lower bound; No-envy; Egalitarian-equivalence;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D39 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Other
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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