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Children crying at birthday parties. Why? Fairness and incentives for cake division problems

We consider the problem of dividing a non-homogeneous one- dimensional continuum whose endpoints are topologically identi¯ed. Examples are the division of a birthday cake, the partition of a circular market, the assignment of sentry duty or medical call. We study the existence of rules satisfying various requirements of fairness (no-envy, egalitarian-equivalence; and several requirements having to do with changes in the data of the problem), and that induce agents to reveal their preferences honestly (strategy-proofness).

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File URL: http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_526.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 526.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:526
Contact details of provider: Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.

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  1. James Schummer, 1996. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 47-56.
  2. Berliant, Marcus & Thomson, William & Dunz, Karl, 1992. "On the fair division of a heterogeneous commodity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 201-216.
  3. Weller, Dietrich, 1985. "Fair division of a measurable space," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 5-17, February.
  4. H. R. Varian, 1973. "Equity, Envy and Efficiency," Working papers 115, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  5. Moulin, Herve, 1987. "The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism versus Laissez-Fairism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(4), pages 769-83, November.
  6. Francis Su, . "Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-10, Claremont Colleges.
  7. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  8. Barbanel, Julius B. & Brams, Steven J., 2004. "Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 251-269, November.
  9. Pazner, Elisha A & Schmeidler, David, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-87, November.
  10. Maniquet, Francois, 2003. "A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 90-103, March.
  11. Jeroen Suijs, 1996. "On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 193-209, December.
  12. Satterthwaite, Mark A & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 587-97, October.
  13. Lin Zhou, 1990. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 954, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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