Children crying at birthday parties. Why? Fairness and incentives for cake division problems
We consider the problem of dividing a non-homogeneous one- dimensional continuum whose endpoints are topologically identi¯ed. Examples are the division of a birthday cake, the partition of a circular market, the assignment of sentry duty or medical call. We study the existence of rules satisfying various requirements of fairness (no-envy, egalitarian-equivalence; and several requirements having to do with changes in the data of the problem), and that induce agents to reveal their preferences honestly (strategy-proofness).
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