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We construct "simple" games implementing in Nash equilibria several solutions to the problem of fair division. These solutions are the no-envy solution, which selects the allocations such that no agent would prefer someone else's bundle to his own, and several variants of this solution. Components of strategies can be interpreted as allocations, consumption bundles, permutations, points in simplices of dimensionalities equal to the number of goods or to the number of agents, and integers. We also propose a simple game implementing the Pareto solution and games implementing the intersections of the Pareto solution with each of these solutions.

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Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 510.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:510
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University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.

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  13. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1996. "Toward Natural Implementation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 949-80, November.
  14. Yamato Takehiko, 1993. "Double Implementation in Nash and Undominated Nash Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 311-323, April.
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  19. Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  20. Walker, Mark, 1981. "A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 65-71, January.
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  24. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-19, March.
  25. Vincent P. Crawford, 1977. "A Game of Fair Division," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(2), pages 235-247.
  26. L. Hurwicz, 1979. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 217-225.
  27. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra, 1994. "Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 173-203, December.
  28. Tadenuma Koichi & Thomson William, 1995. "Games of Fair Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 191-204, May.
  29. Weller, Dietrich, 1985. "Fair division of a measurable space," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 5-17, February.
  30. Thomson, William, 1982. "An informationally efficient equity criterion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 243-263, July.
  31. Andrew Postlewaite & David Wettstein, 1989. "Feasible and Continuous Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 603-611.
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