Strategic Divide and Choose
We consider the classic cake-divison problem when the cake is a heterogeneous good represented by an interval in the real line. We provide a mechanism to implement, in an anonymous way, an envy-free and efficient allocation when agents have private information on their preferences. The mechanism is a multistep sequential game form in which each agent at each step receives a morsel of the cake that is the intersection of what she asks for herself and what the other agent concedes to her.
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- Thomson William, 1994. "Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 219-245, August.
- Weingast, Barry R. & Wittman, Donald, 2008. "The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199548477.
- Steven J. Brams & Paul H. Edelman & Peter C. Fishburn, 2003.
"Fair Division Of Indivisible Items,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 147-180, 09.
- William Thomson, 1996.
"Concepts Of Implementation,"
The Japanese Economic Review,
Japanese Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 133-143, 06.
- Brams, S.J. & Fishburn, P.C., 1998.
"Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity,"
98-20, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2000. "Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(2), pages 247-267.
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- Demko, Stephen & Hill, Theodore P., 1988. "Equitable distribution of indivisible objects," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 145-158, October.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414.
- Vincent P. Crawford, 1977. "A Game of Fair Division," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(2), pages 235-247.
- Berliant, Marcus & Thomson, William & Dunz, Karl, 1992. "On the fair division of a heterogeneous commodity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 201-216.
- Crawford, V. P. & Heller, W. P., 1979. "Fair division with indivisible commodities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 10-27, August.
- Thomson, W., 1991. "Resource-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Divosion when Preferences are Single-Peaked ," RCER Working Papers 301, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Alkan, Ahmet & Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1991. "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1023-1039, July.
- William Thomson, 2004.
RCER Working Papers
510, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2004. "Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 975-1000.
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