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Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market

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  • Takashi Hayashi & Toyotaka Sakai, 2009. "Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), pages 453-467, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:38:y:2009:i:4:p:453-467
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-009-0163-8
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    1. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra, 1994. "Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 173-203, December.
    2. William Thomson, 1999. "Monotonic extensions on economic domains," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(1), pages 13-33.
    3. Claus-Jochen Haake & Bettina Klaus, 2009. "Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 41(3), pages 393-410, December.
    4. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1999. "Characterizing Natural Implementability: The Fair and Walrasian Correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 271-293, August.
    5. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    6. Perez-Castrillo, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 2002. "A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 461-474, April.
    7. Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May.
    8. Alcalde, Jose & Perez-Castrillo, David & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 1998. "Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 469-480, October.
    9. Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi, 1992. "Walrasian social choice in a large economy," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 73-78, August.
    10. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525.
    11. William Thomson, 2007. "Fair Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 539, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    12. GEVERS, Louis, 1986. "Walrasian social choice: some simple axiomatic approaches," LIDAM Reprints CORE 708, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    13. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 47-57, January.
    14. Tayfun Sönmez & Tarik Kara, 1997. "Implementation of college admission rules (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(2), pages 197-218.
    15. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
    16. Tadenuma Koichi & Thomson William, 1995. "Games of Fair Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 191-204, May.
    17. Thomson, William, 2005. "Divide-and-permute," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 186-200, July.
    18. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1996. "Toward Natural Implementation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 949-980, November.
    19. Kara, Tarik & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1996. "Nash Implementation of Matching Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 425-439, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Makoto Hagiwara & Shunsuke Hanato, 2021. "A strategic justification of the constrained equal awards rule through a procedurally fair multilateral bargaining game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(2), pages 233-243, March.
    2. David Pérez-Castrillo & Marilda Sotomayor, 2017. "The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer–seller markets when the agents play strategically," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(1), pages 99-119, June.
    3. Konishi, Hideo & Sapozhnikov, Margarita, 2008. "Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 193-218, September.
    4. Hayashi, Takashi & Lombardi, Michele, 2019. "Constrained implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 546-567.
    5. Ko, Chiu Yu & Konishi, Hideo, 2012. "Profit-maximizing matchmaker," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 217-232.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Job-matching; Many-to-one matching; Nash implementation; Mechanism design; Monotonic extension; Indivisible goods; C78; D78; J41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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