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Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-009-0163-8
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Article provided by Springer & Game Theory Society in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 453-467

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:38:y:2009:i:4:p:453-467
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-009-0163-8
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Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/182/PS2

Keywords: Job-matching; Many-to-one matching; Nash implementation; Mechanism design; Monotonic extension; Indivisible goods; C78; D78; J41;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

  • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
  • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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  1. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra, 1994. "Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 173-203, December.
  2. William Thomson, 1999. "Monotonic extensions on economic domains," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(1), pages 13-33.
  3. Claus-Jochen Haake & Bettina Klaus, 2009. "Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 41(3), pages 393-410, December.
  4. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1999. "Characterizing Natural Implementability: The Fair and Walrasian Correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 271-293, August.
  5. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
  6. Perez-Castrillo, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 2002. "A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 461-474, April.
  7. Alcalde, Jose & Perez-Castrillo, David & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 1998. "Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 469-480, October.
  8. Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi, 1992. "Walrasian social choice in a large economy," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 73-78, August.
  9. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525.
  10. William Thomson, 2007. "Fair Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 539, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  11. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 47-57, January.
  12. Tayfun Sönmez & Tarik Kara, 1997. "Implementation of college admission rules (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(2), pages 197-218.
  13. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
  14. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1996. "Toward Natural Implementation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 949-980, November.
  15. Tadenuma Koichi & Thomson William, 1995. "Games of Fair Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 191-204, May.
  16. Thomson, William, 2005. "Divide-and-permute," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 186-200, July.
  17. Kara, Tarik & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1996. "Nash Implementation of Matching Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 425-439, February.
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Cited by:

  1. repec:spr:joecth:v:64:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-016-0997-9 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Konishi, Hideo & Sapozhnikov, Margarita, 2008. "Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 193-218, September.
  3. Ko, Chiu Yu & Konishi, Hideo, 2012. "Profit-maximizing matchmaker," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 217-232.
  4. David Pérez-Castrillo & Marilda Sotomayor, 2017. "The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer–seller markets when the agents play strategically," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(1), pages 99-119, June.

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