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Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments

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  • Bhaskar Dutta
  • Arunava Sen
  • Rajiv Vohra

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Suggested Citation

  • Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra, 1994. "Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 173-203, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:173-203
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02716620
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Walker, Mark, 1981. "A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 65-71, January.
    2. Schmeidler, David, 1982. "A condition guaranteeing that the Nash allocation is Walrasian," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 376-378, December.
    3. Hurwicz, Leonid, 1979. "On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 140-165, August.
    4. Schmeidler, David, 1980. "Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1585-1593, November.
    5. Reichelstein, Stefan & Reiter, Stanley, 1988. "Game Forms with Minimal Message Spaces," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 661-692, May.
    6. Chander, Parkash, 1983. "On the Informational Size of Message Spaces for Efficient Resource Allocation Processes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 919-938, July.
    7. L. Hurwicz, 1979. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 217-225.
    8. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen, 1991. "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(1), pages 121-128.
    9. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1988. "Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 693-700, May.
    10. Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi, 1991. "A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 106-123, June.
    11. Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216.
    12. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-1099, September.
    13. Guoqiang Tian, 1989. "Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(4), pages 613-621.
    14. Andrew Postlewaite & David Wettstein, 1989. "Feasible and Continuous Implementation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(4), pages 603-611.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash implementation; Social choice correspondence; Elementary mechanism; Economic environment; C72; D51; D78; H40;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General

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