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Eliciting Socially Optimal Rankings from Unfair Jurors

A jury must provide a ranking of contestants (students applying for scholarships or Ph. D. programs, gymnasts in a competition, etc.). There exists a true ranking which is common knowledge among the jurors, but it is not verifiable. The socially optimal rule is that the contestants be ranked according to the true ranking. The jurors are not impartial and, for example, may have friends (contestants that they would like to benefit) and enemies (contestants that they would like to prejudice). We study necessary and sufficient conditions on the jury under which the socially optimal rule is Nash implementable. We also propose a simple mechanism that Nash implements the socially optimal rule under these conditions.

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Paper provided by Centro de Estudios Andaluces in its series Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces with number E2006/10.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2006_10
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  1. Wolinsky, Asher, 2002. "Eliciting information from multiple experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 141-160, October.
  2. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Game Theory and Information 9902003, EconWPA.
    • Krishna, V. & Morgan, J., 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Papers 206, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    • Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Working Papers 154, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics..
  3. Matthew 0. Jackson, 1989. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies - A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 833, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  5. Amoros, Pablo & Corchon, Luis C. & Moreno, Bernardo, 2002. "The Scholarship Assignment Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-18, January.
  6. John Duggan & Cesar Martinelli, 1998. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Wallis Working Papers WP14, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  7. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1988. "Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 693-700, May.
  8. Peyton Young, 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 51-64, Winter.
  9. Thomson, William, 2005. "Divide-and-permute," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 186-200, July.
  10. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts," Discussion Papers 1170, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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