A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
We analyze the problem of a jury choosing the winner from a set of agents when the identity of the deserving winner is common knowledge amongst the jurors but each juror is biased in favor of one di¤erent agent. We propose a simple and natural mechanism that implements the socially optimal rule (the winner is the deserving winner) in subgame perfect equilibria.
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- Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
- Amorós, Pablo, 2009.
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"Role of honesty in full implementation,"
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Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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