A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
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- Pablo Amorós, 2010. "A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants," Working Papers 2010-07, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
References listed on IDEAS
- Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Role of honesty in full implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
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- Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 1992.
"Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms,"
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Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 757-775.
- Matthew 0. Jackson, 1989. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies - A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 833, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Amorós, Pablo, 2009.
"Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors,"
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Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1211-1226, May.
- Pablo Amorós, 2006. "Eliciting Socially Optimal Rankings from Unfair Jurors," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2006/10, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
- Amoros, Pablo & Corchon, Luis C. & Moreno, Bernardo, 2002. "The Scholarship Assignment Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1990. "Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 285-299, April.
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More about this item
KeywordsMechanism design Contest Subgame perfect equilibrium;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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