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A mechanism to pick the deserving winner


  • Moskalenko, Anna


A group of individuals is choosing an individual (the winner) among themselves, when the identity of the deserving winner is a common knowledge among individuals. A simple mechanism of voting by veto is proposed as an alternative to the mechanism studied by Amorós (2011). Like Amorós’(2011), the suggested mechanism implements the socially desirable outcome (the deserving winner is chosen) in subgame perfect equilibria. Keywords: Implementation, mechanism design, subgame perfect equilibrium, individuals choosing among themselves, voting by veto. JEL classification: C72, D71, D78

Suggested Citation

  • Moskalenko, Anna, 2015. "A mechanism to pick the deserving winner," Working Papers 2072/252215, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/252215

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    2. Matthew O. Jackson, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 757-775.
    3. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1990. "Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 285-299, April.
    4. Amorós, Pablo, 2011. "A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 241-244, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ascensión Andina Díaz & José A. García-Martínez, 2015. "A theory of media self-silence," Working Papers 2015-05, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    2. Pablo Amorós, 2014. "Conditions on the jury for the natural implementation of the deserving winner of a contest," Working Papers 2014-01, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    3. Amorós, Pablo, 2016. "Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 44-57.
    4. Doğan, Battal, 2017. "Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 103-110.

    More about this item


    Jocs no-cooperatius (Matemàtica); Elecció social; 33 - Economia;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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