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A maximal domain for weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness of the extended probabilistic serial correspondence

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  • Yun, Kiyong
  • Chun, Youngsub

Abstract

On the strict preference domain, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) introduce the probabilistic serial rule and show that the rule is weakly stochastic dominance strategy-proof. Katta and Sethuraman (2006) introduce the extended probabilistic serial correspondence, which generalizes the probabilistic serial rule to the full preference domain. However, this correspondence is not weakly stochastic dominance strategy-proof. In this paper, we introduce a subdomain of the full preference domain, which we call “the sequentially ranked from the top domain,” on which the correspondence is weakly stochastic dominance strategy-proof. In fact, it is a maximal domain on which the three requirements of stochastic dominance efficiency, stochastic dominance envyfreeness, and weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness are compatible. In addition, on this domain, we provide an axiomatic characterization of it by adapting its characterization on the full preference domain (Heo and Yılmaz, 2015).

Suggested Citation

  • Yun, Kiyong & Chun, Youngsub, 2026. "A maximal domain for weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness of the extended probabilistic serial correspondence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 10-26.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:155:y:2026:i:c:p:10-26
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.001
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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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