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Full agreement and the provision of threshold public goods

  • Federica Alberti

    ()

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena)

  • Edward J. Cartwright

    ()

    (School of Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury)

We report threshold public good experiments in which group members not only need to be individually willing to contribute enough to provide the public good but also have to agree with each other on what every group members should contribute. We find strong support to the hypothesis that full agreement increases successful provision, although it takes a few repetitions before group members can successfully coordinate. This is consistent with our theoretical results that full agreement works because it increases criticality of each individual decision. The existence of a focal point makes it possible for the group members to successfully coordinate.

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Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2011-063.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-063
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