Corporate Takeovers in the Laboratory When Shareholders Own More Than One Share
Tendering decisions of shareholders endowed with multiple shares are studied in the laboratory to test game-theoretic models of the tendering process. Tendered shares cycle around the equilibrium level. Contrary to game-theoretic predictions, bid level and bid type affect the number of shares tendered and the bid success rate. When players are given unequal endowments of shares, an equal proportion strategy organizes the data better than B. Holmstrom and B. Nalebuff's (1992) symmetric focal equilibrium in which larger shareholders tender down to a common share level. However, large shareholders often tender proportionately more shares than small shareholders. Copyright 1998 by University of Chicago Press.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:71:y:1998:i:4:p:537-72. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.