Budget processes: Theory and experimental evidence
This paper studies budget processes, both theoretically and experimentally. We compare the outcomes of bottom-up and top-down budget processes. It is often presumed that a top-down budget process leads to a smaller overall budget than a bottom-up budget process. We show, using structurally induced equilibrium theory, that this may but need not be the case. To test the implications for budget processes of structurally induced equilibrium theory, we conduct a series of experiments. The evidence from these experiments supports the predictions of structurally induced equilibrium theory, both at the aggregate and at the individual subject level.
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