IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/biu/wpaper/2009-14.html

The Efficient and Fair Approval of “Multiple-Cost-Single-Benefit” Projects Under Unilateral Information

Author

Listed:
  • Nava Kahana

    (Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University,IZA, Bonn)

  • Yosef Mealem

    (Netanya Academic College, The School of Banking & Finance Netanya, Israel)

  • Shmuel Nitzan

    (Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University)

Abstract

This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-cost–single-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Nava Kahana & Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2009. "The Efficient and Fair Approval of “Multiple-Cost-Single-Benefit” Projects Under Unilateral Information," Working Papers 2009-14, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2009-14
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www2.biu.ac.il/soc/ec/wp/2009-14.pdf
    File Function: Working paper
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2009-14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Department of Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/debaril.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.