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Volunteering for heterogeneous tasks

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  • Sahuguet, Nicolas

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  • Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2006. "Volunteering for heterogeneous tasks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 333-349, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:56:y:2006:i:2:p:333-349
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1995. "Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1321-1335, November.
    2. Bilodeau, Marc & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "Toilet cleaning and department chairing: Volunteering a public service," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 299-308, February.
    3. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1988. "Coordination through Committees and Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 235-252, Summer.
    4. Bliss, Christopher & Nalebuff, Barry, 1984. "Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-12, November.
    5. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    6. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 943-960, July.
    7. Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1999. "The Generalized War of Attrition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 175-189, March.
    8. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    9. Bolton, Patrick & Farrell, Joseph, 1990. "Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 803-826, August.
    10. Andreas Park & Lones Smith, 2004. "Caller Number Five: Timing Games that Morph From One Form to Another," 2004 Meeting Papers 871, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    11. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Emeric Henry & Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda, 2016. "Keeping Secrets: The Economics of Access Deterrence," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 95-118, August.
    2. Barbos, Andrei, 2013. "De-synchronized clocks in preemption games with risky prospects," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 203-216.
    3. Ruiz-Aliseda, Francisco, 2012. "Innovation Beyond Patents: Technological Complexity as a Protection against Imitation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8870, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Florian Morath, 2013. "Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 99-131, June.
    5. , & ,, 2008. "Caller Number Five and related timing games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(2), June.
    6. Stefano Barbieri & Kai A. Konrad & David A. Malueg, 2020. "Preemption contests between groups," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 934-961, September.
    7. Andreas Park & Lones Smith, 2004. "Caller Number Five: Timing Games that Morph From One Form to Another," 2004 Meeting Papers 871, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Susanne Goldlücke & Thomas Tröger, 2018. "Assigning an unpleasant task without payment," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_003, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    9. Li, Hongcheng, 2019. "Multi-Player War of Attrition with Asymmetric Incomplete Information," MPRA Paper 109511, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Aug 2021.
    10. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/dambferfb7dfprc9m0533i43h is not listed on IDEAS
    11. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/dambferfb7dfprc9m0533i43h is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Goldlücke, Susanne & Tröger, Thomas, 2018. "Assigning an unpleasant task without payment," Working Papers 18-02, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.

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