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Innovation beyond Patents: Technological Complexity as a Protection against Imitation

Author

Listed:
  • Emeric Henry

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research)

  • Francisco Ruiz Aliseda

    (X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

Abstract

A large portion of innovators do not patent their inventions. This is a relative puzzle since innovators are often perceived to be at the mercy of imitators in the absence of legal protection. In practice, innovators however invest actively in making their products technologically hard to reverse engineer. We consider the dynamics of imitation and investment in technological complexity, both by the innovator and by imitators. We show it can justify high level of proÖts beyond patents, can shed light on the regulation of reverse engineering and can explain delays in adoption of innovations.

Suggested Citation

  • Emeric Henry & Francisco Ruiz Aliseda, 2013. "Innovation beyond Patents: Technological Complexity as a Protection against Imitation," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03461033, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03461033
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03461033
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Emeric Henry & Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda, 2016. "Keeping Secrets: The Economics of Access Deterrence," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 95-118, August.
    2. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Galbiati, Roberto, 2013. "Rational parasites," CEPR Discussion Papers 9351, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/d3pr45c1e8egae1q88dc5jo6u is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Galbiati, Roberto & Henry, Emeric, 2017. "Investing to cooperate: Theory and experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 1-17.
    5. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/dambferfb7dfprc9m0533i43h is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Ruiz-Aliseda, Francisco, 2012. "Innovation Beyond Patents: Technological Complexity as a Protection against Imitation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8870, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Bronwyn H. Hall & Christian Helmers & Mark Rogers & Vania Sena, 2012. "The Choice between Formal and Informal Intellectual Property: A Literature Review," NBER Working Papers 17983, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno, 2014. "Innovation and imitation incentives in dynamic duopoly," MPRA Paper 59453, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/d3pr45c1e8egae1q88dc5jo6u is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Galbiati, Roberto & Henry, Emeric, 2017. "Investing to cooperate: Theory and experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 1-17.
    11. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/dambferfb7dfprc9m0533i43h is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Nguyen, Thi Phuong Thao & Huang, Fang & Tian, Xiaowen, 2023. "Intellectual property protection need as a driver for open innovation: Empirical evidence from Vietnam," Technovation, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    13. Michael Klein & Yibai Yang, 2024. "Blocking Patents, Rent Protection and Economic Growth"," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 52, pages 1-20, April.
    14. Senyuta, Olena & Žigić, Krešimir, 2016. "Managing spillovers: An endogenous sunk cost approach," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 45-64.
    15. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/59r8grug28881rf8or7715f88g is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Andreas Panagopoulos & In-Uck Park, 2016. "Patenting vs. Secrecy for Startups and the Trade of Patents as Negotiating Assets," Working Papers 1610, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    17. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/dambferfb7dfprc9m0533i43h is not listed on IDEAS
    18. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/dambferfb7dfprc9m0533i43h is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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