Transactions Costs and Coalition Stability under Majority Rule
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- Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 2003. "Transaction Costs and Coalition Stability under Majority Rule," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(2), pages 193-207, April.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Stefano Barbieri & Kai A. Konrad & David A. Malueg, 2020.
"Preemption contests between groups,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 934-961, September.
- Barbieri, Stefano & Konrad, Kai A. & Malueg, David A., 2019. "Preemption Contests Between Groups," CEPR Discussion Papers 13738, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Armelle Mazé & Claude Ménard, 2010.
"Private ordering, collective action, and the self-enforcing range of contracts,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 131-153, February.
- Armelle Mazé & Claude Ménard, 2007. "Private Ordering, Collective Action, and the Self-Enforcing Range of Contracts," Post-Print halshs-00273851, HAL.
- Fleck, Robert K., 2013.
"Why did the electorate swing between parties during the Great Depression?,"
Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 599-619.
- Robert K. Fleck, 2012. "Why Did the Electorate Swing Between Parties During the Great Depression?," NBER Chapters, in: The Microeconomics of New Deal Policy, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Xuesong Li & Yunlong Ding & Yuxuan Li, 2019. "M-Government Cooperation for Sustainable Development in China: A Transaction Cost and Resource-Based View," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 11(7), pages 1-1, March.
- Maze, Armelle, 2006. "Multilateral reputation mechanisms and contract law in agriculture : complement or substitutes," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21285, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- John Joseph Wallis & Barry R. Weingast, 2005. "Equilibrium Impotence: Why the States and Not the American National Government Financed Economic Development in the Antebellum Era," NBER Working Papers 11397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Armelle Mazé & Claude Ménard, 2010.
"Private Ordering, Collective Action, and the Self-Enforcing Range of Contracts. The Case of French Livestock Industry,"
Post-Print
halshs-00624288, HAL.
- Armelle Mazé & Claude Ménard, 2010. "Private Ordering, Collective Action, and the Self-Enforcing Range of Contracts. The Case of French Livestock Industry," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00624288, HAL.
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JEL classification:
- K0 - Law and Economics - - General
- H0 - Public Economics - - General
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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