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The stability inducing propensities of very unstable coalitions: avoiding the downward spiral of majoritarian rent-seeking

  • Congleton, Roger D.
  • Tollison, Robert D.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V97-3WRBNK7-3/2/2eb199098dfb588ae5a67288c0021ffc
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 15 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 193-205

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:15:y:1999:i:2:p:193-205
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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  1. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
  2. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
  3. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
  4. Stratmann, Thomas, 1996. " Instability of Collective Decisions? Testing for Cyclical Majorities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 88(1-2), pages 15-28, July.
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1980. "Stability of decision systems under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 150-159, October.
  6. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1995. "Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 523-536.
  7. Joe Oppenheimer, 1979. "Outcomes of logrolling in the bargaining set and democratic theory: Some conjectures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 419-434, September.
  8. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, June.
  9. Congleton, Roger D., 1984. "Committees and rent-seeking effort," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 197-209, November.
  10. Peter Bernholz, 1973. "Logrolling, arrow paradox and cyclical majorities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 87-95, June.
  11. Tullock, Gordon, 1997. " Where Is the Rectangle?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 149-59, April.
  12. James M. Buchanan, 1954. "Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 114.
  13. Le Breton, M & Salles, M, 1990. "The Stability Set of Voting Games: Classification and Genericity Results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 111-27.
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