The stability inducing propensities of very unstable coalitions: avoiding the downward spiral of majoritarian rent-seeking
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- Roger Congleton, 2014.
"The contractarian constitutional political economy of James Buchanan,"
Constitutional Political Economy,
Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 39-67, March.
- Roger D. Congleton, 2013. "The Contractarian Constitutional Political Economy of James Buchanan," Working Papers 13-08, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
- Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 2003.
"Transaction Costs and Coalition Stability under Majority Rule,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(2), pages 193-207, April.
- Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 2001. "Transactions Costs and Coalition Stability under Majority Rule," ICER Working Papers 04-2002, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Roger Congleton, 2012. "The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 131-146, July.
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