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Strukturinduzierte Politikgleichgewichte: Das Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz (GSG) und seine Vorgänger

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  • Manow, Philip

Abstract

Der neuzeitliche Staatsbegriff setzt Souveränität nach außen und die hierarchische Überordnung der Staatsgewalt über alle gesellschaftlichen Kräfte im Inneren voraus - Prämissen, welche durch die Ableitung der Staatsgewalt aus der Volkssouveränität zwar ergänzt aber nicht verdrängt werden sollten. Moderne Staaten finden sich jedoch eingebunden in ein immer dichteres Geflecht transnationaler und innergesellschaftlicher Abhängigkeiten und Verhandlungszwänge, welche nicht nur die Möglichkeit der hierarchisch-souveränen Alleinentscheidung, sondern auch die Idee der demokratischen Selbstbestimmung in Frage stellen. Darin darf jedoch nicht nur eine Abweichung vom normativen Ideal gesehen werden. Verhandlungssysteme verfügen über ein eigenständiges Wohlfahrtspotential, das von einer realitätsangemessenen normativen Theorie berücksichtigt werden muß. Aufgabe der positiven politischen Theorie ist dann die Klärung der institutionellen und situationalen Voraussetzungen, unter denen dieses Potential mehr oder weniger genutzt werden kann. Insbesondere bedürfen die Komplementaritäten und Interferenzen zwischen hierarchischer Koordination und nicht-hierarchischen Formen der horizontalen Selbstkoordination der systematischen Untersuchung.

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  • Manow, Philip, 1994. "Strukturinduzierte Politikgleichgewichte: Das Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz (GSG) und seine Vorgänger," MPIfG Discussion Paper 94/5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:945
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    1. Czada, Roland, 1995. "Der Kampf um die Finanzierung der deutschen Einheit," MPIfG Discussion Paper 95/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

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