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Gesundheitspolitik im Einigungsprozeß

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  • Manow, Philip

Abstract

In diesem Buch wird den im gesundheitspolitischen Einigungsprozeß aufbrechenden Konflikten und ihrer zumeist weit zurückreichenden Vorgeschichte nachgegangen. Anhand dieser Darstellungen werden die Faktoren analysiert, die zu der gesundheitspolitischen Trans- formationsentscheidung geführt haben. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, daß dieses Politikresultat auf die bekannten Blockadewirkungen der Interessenskonstellationen im westdeutschen Gesundheitssystem zurückzuführen ist, die durch vereinigungs- spezifische Bedingungen noch verstärkt wurden.

Suggested Citation

  • Manow, Philip, 1994. "Gesundheitspolitik im Einigungsprozeß," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 16, number 16.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgs:16
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Weaver, R. Kent, 1986. "The Politics of Blame Avoidance," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(4), pages 371-398, October.
    2. Viktor Vanberg, 1992. "Organizations as constitutional systems," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 223-253, March.
    3. John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
    4. Wasem, Jürgen, 1992. "Von der "Poliklinik" in die Kassenarztpraxis: Versuch einer Rekonstruktion der Entscheidungssituation ambulant tätiger Ärzte in Ostdeutschland," MPIfG Discussion Paper 92/5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jochem, Sven, 1999. "Sozialpolitik in der Ära Kohl: Die Politik des Sozialversicherungsstaates," Working papers of the ZeS 12/1999, University of Bremen, Centre for Social Policy Research (ZeS).
    2. Manow, Philip, 1994. "Strukturinduzierte Politikgleichgewichte: Das Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz (GSG) und seine Vorgänger," MPIfG Discussion Paper 94/5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    3. Robischon, Tobias & Stucke, Andreas & Wasem, Jürgen & Wolf, Hans-Georg, 1994. "Die politische Logik der deutschen Vereinigung und der Institutionentransfer: Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel von Gesundheitswesen, Forschungssystem und Telekommunikation," MPIfG Discussion Paper 94/3, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

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