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Organizations as constitutional systems

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  • Viktor Vanberg

Abstract

Four theoretical approaches to the study of organizations that can be identified in the relevant literature are compared: Thegoal paradigm, theexchange paradigm, thenexus of contracts paradigm, and theconstitutional paradigm. It is argued that the latter provides the more fruitful theoretical perspective in that it reconciles an individualist methodology with an account of organisations as corporate actors, as units of collective action. Copyright George Mason University 1992

Suggested Citation

  • Viktor Vanberg, 1992. "Organizations as constitutional systems," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 223-253, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:3:y:1992:i:2:p:223-253
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02393121
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Klein, Benjamin, 1983. "Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 367-374, June.
    2. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-163, February.
    3. Armen Alchian & Susan Woodward, 1997. "The Firm is Dead; Long Live the Firm: A Review of Oliver E. Williamson's The Economic Institutions of Capitalism," Chapters, in: Svetozar Pejovich (ed.), The Economic Foundations of Property Rights, chapter 15, pages 206-220, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Vanberg, Viktor & Buchanan, James M, 1986. "Organization Theory and Fiscal Economics: Society, State, and Public Debt," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 215-227, Fall.
    5. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Klaus Heine, 2013. "Inside the black box: incentive regulation and incentive channeling on energy markets," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(1), pages 157-186, February.
    2. Elert, Niklas & Stenkula, Mikael, 2020. "Intrapreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive," Working Paper Series 1367, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    3. Matthias Benz & Bruno S. Frey, 2006. "Towards a Constitutional Theory of Corporate Governance," IEW - Working Papers 304, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    4. Roger D. Congleton, 2015. "On the Evolution of Organizational Governance: Divided Governance and Survival in the Long Run," Working Papers 15-25, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    5. Werle, Raymund & Leib, Volker, 1999. "The Internet society and its struggle for recognition and influence," MPIfG Working Paper 99/12, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    6. Viktor Vanberg, 2014. "James Buchanan’s contractarian individualism: A personal account," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(2), pages 147-156, June.
    7. David Jones, 1997. "Asian Values and the Constitutional Order of Contemporary Singapore," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 283-300, December.
    8. Viktor Vanberg, 2007. "Corporate social responsibility and the ‘game of catallaxy’: the perspective of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 199-222, September.
    9. Manow, Philip, 1994. "Gesundheitspolitik im Einigungsprozeß," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 16, number 16.
    10. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2013. "Ethics, economic organization and the social contract," Chapters, in: Anna Grandori (ed.), Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Ute Schmiel & Hendrik Sander, 2022. "What are markets? Selected market theories under genuine uncertainty in comparison," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 9-33, January.
    12. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2015. "Constitutional political economy," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 15/06, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    13. Anthony Evans & Nikolai Wenzel, 2013. "A framework for the study of firms as constitutional orders," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 2-18, March.
    14. Mudambi, Ram & Navarra, Pietro, 2002. "Institutions and internation business: a theoretical overview," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 635-646, December.
    15. Schmidt, Torsten, 2001. "Finanzreformen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Analyse der Veränderungen der Finanzverfassung von 1949 bis 1989," RWI Schriften, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, volume 67, number 67.
    16. Scherer Anna-Lena & Schmiel Ute, 2021. "Ethical and Legal Responsibility of Multinational Corporate Groups for a Fair Share of Taxes," Nordic Tax Journal, Sciendo, vol. 2021(1), pages 32-46, October.

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