Organizations as constitutional systems
Four theoretical approaches to the study of organizations that can be identified in the relevant literature are compared: Thegoal paradigm, theexchange paradigm, thenexus of contracts paradigm, and theconstitutional paradigm. It is argued that the latter provides the more fruitful theoretical perspective in that it reconciles an individualist methodology with an account of organisations as corporate actors, as units of collective action. Copyright George Mason University 1992
Volume (Year): 3 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-163, February.
- Vanberg, Viktor & Buchanan, James M, 1986. "Organization Theory and Fiscal Economics: Society, State, and Public Debt," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 215-27, Fall.
- Klein, Benjamin, 1983. "Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 367-74, June.
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