IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/copoec/v24y2013i1p2-18.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A framework for the study of firms as constitutional orders

Author

Listed:
  • Anthony Evans

    ()

  • Nikolai Wenzel

Abstract

Much of the literature on corporate performance focuses on institutional restructuring, and implicitly assumes that constitutional factors are determined exogenously. Existing theories of the firm—whether a “goal paradigm” or an “exchange paradigm”—provide useful insights; but we find them incomplete because they miss the extent to which companies build unique and meaningful constitutional orders. Building on Vanberg (Const Polit Econ 3(2):223–253, 1992 ), we investigate the extent to which the field of constitutional political economy (CPE) can improve our understanding of organisations, by providing a typology of CPE that can be applied to a study of firms. We make a distinction among (1) operational; (2) institutional; and (3) constitutional levels of management, and based on the CPE literature argue that “constitutional” considerations help us to define the boundaries of a firm and its operational environment. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Anthony Evans & Nikolai Wenzel, 2013. "A framework for the study of firms as constitutional orders," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 2-18, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:24:y:2013:i:1:p:2-18
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-012-9129-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10602-012-9129-0
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jensen, Michael C & Meckling, William H, 1979. "Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 469-506, October.
    2. Voigt, Stefan, 1997. "Positive Constitutional Economics: A Survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 11-53, March.
    3. Jankovic Ivan, 2010. "Firm as a Nexus of Markets," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-29, October.
    4. Viktor Vanberg, 1992. "Organizations as constitutional systems," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 223-253, March.
    5. James Buchanan, 1990. "The domain of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, December.
    6. Nikolai Wenzel, 2010. "From contract to mental model: Constitutional culture as a fact of the social sciences," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 23(1), pages 55-78, March.
    7. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    8. Toboso, Fernando, 2001. "Institutional Individualism and Institutional Change: The Search for a Middle Way Mode of Explanation," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(6), pages 765-783, November.
    9. Gordon, Scott, 1976. "The New Contractarians," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(3), pages 573-590, June.
    10. Gifford, Adam, Jr, 1991. "A Constitutional Interpretation of the Firm," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 68(1-3), pages 91-106, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitutional management; Theory of the firm; Institutions; B53; D23; L22; P51;

    JEL classification:

    • B53 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Austrian
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:24:y:2013:i:1:p:2-18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.