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Unanimous consent and constitutional economics

In: Handbook of Social Choice and Voting

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  • Randall G. Holcombe

Abstract

This Handbook provides an overview of interdisciplinary research related to social choice and voting that is intended for a broad audience. Expert contributors from various fields present critical summaries of the existing literature, including intuitive explanations of technical terminology and well-known theorems, suggesting new directions for research.

Suggested Citation

  • Randall G. Holcombe, 2015. "Unanimous consent and constitutional economics," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 3, pages 35-53, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:15584_3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995, June.
    2. Karl Schurter & Bart J. Wilson, 2009. "Justice and Fairness in the Dictator Game," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 130-145, July.
    3. James M. Buchanan, 1962. "The relevance of Pareto optimality," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 6(4), pages 341-354, December.
    4. James M. Buchanan, 1949. "The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(6), pages 496-496.
    5. Gordon, Scott, 1976. "The New Contractarians," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(3), pages 573-590, June.
    6. Hochman, Harold M & Rodgers, James D, 1969. "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 542-557, Part I Se.
    7. Karl Schurter & Bart J. Wilson, 2009. "Justice and Fairness in the Dictator Game," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 76(1), pages 130-145, July.
    8. Karl Schurter & Bart J. Wilson, 2009. "Justice and Fairness in the Dictator Game," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 76(1), pages 130-145, July.
    9. Randall Holcombe, 2008. "Why does government produce national defense?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 11-19, October.
    10. Leland B. Yeager, 1985. "Rights, Contract, and Utility in Policy Espousal," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 5(1), pages 259-294, Spring/Su.
    11. Beard, Charles A., 1913. "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, edition 127, number beard1913.
    12. James M. Buchanan, 1954. "Individual Choice in Voting and the Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(4), pages 334-334.
    13. Randall G. Holcombe, 1994. "The Economic Foundations of Government," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-13230-0, August.
    14. Randall Holcombe, 1991. "Constitutions as constraints: A case study of three american constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 303-328, September.
    15. James Buchanan, 1990. "The domain of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, December.
    16. James M. Buchanan & Richard A. Musgrave, 1999. "Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the State," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262024624, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Heckelman, Jac C. & Wilson, Bonnie, 2019. "The growth-maximizing level of regulation: Evidence from a panel of international data," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 354-368.

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