IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-02288776.html

Introduction: a symposium on the predatory state

Author

Listed:
  • Mehrdad Vahabi

    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - USPC - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Economists have adopted two broad perspectives on the state: contractual (i.e., provider of public goods and services) and predatory (coercive and extractive). By a predatory state, we mean a state that promotes the private interests of dominant groups within the state (such as politicians, the army and bureaucrats) or influential private groups with strong lobbying powers. Neo-institutional economists support an extended version of the contractual perspective in which the state is not simply a ‘benevolent dictator’ but may itself be composed of predators. However, it considers predation as only a means to promote protection. By contrast, a predatory vision of the state argues that while protection and predation are two faces of the same coin, a predatory state protects only to promote its predation on the private sector. This symposium explores how a predatory approach to the state can shed light on all types of state, from liberal democratic to authoritarian and failed ones, both in the past and present.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Mehrdad Vahabi, 2019. "Introduction: a symposium on the predatory state," Post-Print hal-02288776, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02288776
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00715-2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Anthony Gill, 2021. "The comparative endurance and efficiency of religion: a public choice perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 313-334, December.
    2. Doug Jones, 2021. "Barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(9), pages 1-33, September.
    3. Harris,Colin & Cai,Meina & Murtazashvili,Ilia & Murtazashvili,Jennifer Brick, 2020. "The Origins and Consequences of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108969055, January.
    4. Zaostrovtsev, A., 2024. "State: Predatory nature vs. civil society," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 65(4), pages 237-244.
    5. Bálint Madlovics & Bálint Magyar, 2021. "Post-communist predation: modeling reiderstvo practices in contemporary predatory states," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 187(3), pages 247-273, June.
    6. Paniagua, Victoria & Vogler, Jan P., 2022. "Economic elites and the constitutional design of sharing political power," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 110926, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Ilia Murtazashvili, 2021. "Ilya Somin, Free to Move: Foot Voting, Migration, and Political Freedom. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020. 272 Pages. USD 29.95 (hardback)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 603-606, December.
    8. Gregory W. Caskey & Ilia Murtazashvili, 2022. "The predatory state and coercive assimilation: The case of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 217-235, April.
    9. Samira Guennif, 2022. "Capture and passive predation in times of COVID-19 pandemic," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 193(3), pages 163-186, December.
    10. Rui Wang & Qianmao Zhu & Matthew Noellert, 2024. "Weak central government, strong legal rights: the origins of divergent legal institutions in 18th-century Chinese and Japanese rice markets," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-15, December.
    11. Victoria Paniagua & Jan P. Vogler, 2022. "Economic elites and the constitutional design of sharing political power," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 25-52, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
    • I3 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02288776. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.